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Ranking Ranking Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Medina Barak

    () (Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905 Israel)

  • Naeh Shlomo

    () (Department of Talmud, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel; Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Segal Uzi

    () (Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill MA 02467, USA)

Abstract

Transitivity is a fundamental requirement for consistency. Legal systems, especially when composed over time and by different agencies, may encounter non-transitive cycles, in which by one rule the law prefers one outcome a over another outcome b, by another rule b trumps some third result c, but a third rule ranks c higher than a. This paper discusses a new solution to such cycles in which the relevant rules of preferences are ranked and then applied until a transitive order of the options is obtained. The paper provides a formal generalization of this solution, and demonstrates its possible implementation to some legal issues. It is also shown that this solution can be traced to the Rabbinic literature, starting with the Mishnah and the Talmud (1st–5th c CE).

Suggested Citation

  • Medina Barak & Naeh Shlomo & Segal Uzi, 2013. "Ranking Ranking Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 73-96, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:73-96:n:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2006. "Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number gradmicro1.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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