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Inflation and energy price shocks: lessons from the 1970s

Author

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  • Francesco Corsello

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Matteo Gomellini

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Dario Pellegrino

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

The Yom Kippur war in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979 triggered large oil-price increases that fuelled high and persistent inflation in advanced countries. There is a broad consensus that a weak monetary policy response, in the form of late tightening or early loosening, was one of the main causes for the failure to keep inflation under control after the 1973 shock. This failure is crucially tied to the end of the Bretton Woods era in 1971, when the fixed exchange rate regime and the currency peg to gold were abandoned, and monetary policy lost a consolidated frame of reference. A new framework – based on the commitment by independent and credible central banks to achieve clear quantitative inflation targets – would only be established in the subsequent two decades. Monetary policy conduct alone, however, does not fully explain the persistence and heterogeneity of inflation across advanced economies. Other institutional factors played a role ‒ most importantly, the lack of central bank independence, the structural features of the labour market, and fiscal policy rules which turned out to be at odds with price stability. A structural VAR-based analysis confirms and quantifies the role these factors played in shaping inflation. Nowadays, the institutional context has evolved considerably, mitigating the risk of inflation staying high for as long as they did in the 1970s. Ensuring that the current institutional context continues to support price stability remains key in limiting inflation persistence.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Corsello & Matteo Gomellini & Dario Pellegrino, 2023. "Inflation and energy price shocks: lessons from the 1970s," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 790, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_790_23
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    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2023-0790/QEF_790_23.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Adolfsen, Jakob Feveile & Ferrari Minesso, Massimo & Mork, Jente Esther & Van Robays, Ine, 2024. "Gas price shocks and euro area inflation," Working Paper Series 2905, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic history; inflation; oil shocks; monetary policy; central bank independence; wage indexation; fiscal policy.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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