IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility: An Update

  • Oleksiy Kryvtsov
  • Malik Shukayev
  • Alexander Ueberfeldt

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to price-level targeting are small. A welfare loss occurs, if imperfect credibility is highly persistent.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/wp08-37.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 08-37.

as
in new window

Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:08-37
Contact details of provider: Postal: 234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G9, Canada
Phone: 613 782-8845
Fax: 613 782-8874
Web page: http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Ernst Schaumburg & Andrea Tambalotti, 2003. "An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy," Macroeconomics 0302004, EconWPA.
  2. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2007. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 728-752, April.
  3. Peter N. Ireland, 2004. "Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model," NBER Working Papers 10309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 4111, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Inflation Stabilization and Welfare: The Case of a Distorted Steady State," NBER Working Papers 10838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Clarida, R. & Gali, J. & Gertler, M., 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Working Papers 99-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  7. Almeida Neto, Heitor Vieira de & Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar, 1999. "Optimal State-Dependent Rules, Credibility, and Inflation Inertia," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 349, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  8. Christopher J. Erceg and Andrew T. Levin, 2001. "Imperfect Credibility and Inflation Persistence," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 19, Society for Computational Economics.
  9. Ascari, Guido, 2002. "Staggered Price and Trend Inflation:Some Nuisances," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 10, Royal Economic Society.
  10. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument," NBER Working Papers 13398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. Yetman, James, 2005. "The credibility of the monetary policy "free lunch"," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 434-451, September.
  13. Vestin, David, 2000. "Price-level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting in a Forward-looking Model," Working Paper Series 106, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  14. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474.
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  16. Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2006. "On Linear Quadratic Approximations," MPRA Paper 544, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2006.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:08-37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.