IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/baf/cbafwp/cbafwp26275.html

Criminal Capture and The Reallocation of Political Participation

Author

Listed:
  • Massimo Pulejo

Abstract

How do citizens react to the criminal capture of state institutions? Do they simply reduce their engagement with public life or do they reallocate it across different channels of participation? With an event-study design, I show that revealing collusion between Italian public officials and organized criminal groups leads to a modest reduction in electoral turnout. However, collusion episodes are also followed by a sizable increase in the participation of citizens to the activities of civil society organizations fighting organized crime. I analyze the causal mechanisms behind this effect with an original survey experiment. Receiving information about the incidence of collusion increases citizens’ concerns about organized criminal groups while decreasing their confidence that the state will contrast them. This induces reallocation: collusion weakens electoral participation while strengthening civic engagement. These findings complement the existing literature about the effects of state capture on citizens’ behavior, showing that it can foster their engagement in non-traditional forms of political participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Pulejo, 2026. "Criminal Capture and The Reallocation of Political Participation," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 26275, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp26275
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.unibocconi.it/baffic/baf/papers/cbafwp26275.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Manacorda & Andrea Tesei, 2020. "Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 533-567, March.
    2. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624, December.
    3. Hungerman, Daniel M., 2005. "Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2245-2267, December.
    4. Andreoni, James & Payne, A. Abigail, 2011. "Is crowding out due entirely to fundraising? Evidence from a panel of charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 334-343.
    5. Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. Tverdova, 2003. "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 91-109, January.
    6. Sun, Liyang & Abraham, Sarah, 2021. "Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 175-199.
    7. Daniele, Vittorio & Marani, Ugo, 2011. "Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy: A panel data analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-142, March.
    8. Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, 2022. "Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources [“Mafiaand Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 774-839.
    9. Goodman-Bacon, Andrew, 2021. "Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 254-277.
    10. Gruber, Jonathan & Hungerman, Daniel M., 2007. "Faith-based charity and crowd-out during the great depression," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1043-1069, June.
    11. Paolo Pinotti, 2015. "The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 203-232, August.
    12. Pulejo, Massimo, 2025. "Private response to exclusionary welfare policy: Evidence from Italian municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 248(C).
    13. Heyes, Anthony & Lyon, Thomas P. & Martin, Steve, 2018. "Salience games: Private politics when public attention is limited," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 396-410.
    14. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2018. "Trust no more? On the lasting effects of corruption scandals," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 185-203.
    15. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    16. Callaway, Brantly & Sant’Anna, Pedro H.C., 2021. "Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 200-230.
    17. Giommoni, Tommaso, 2021. "Exposure to corruption and political participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francesca M. Calamunci & Livio Ferrante & Rossana Scebba & Gianpiero Torrisi, 2023. "Mafia doesn't live here anymore: Antimafia policies and housing prices," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 1001-1025, September.
    2. Francesca M. Calamunci & Livio Ferrante & Rossana Scebba, 2022. "Closed for mafia: Evidence from the removal of mafia firms on commercial property values," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1487-1511, November.
    3. Panjwani, Aniket & Xiong, Heyu, 2023. "The causes and consequences of medical crowdfunding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 648-667.
    4. Zhang, Yufei & Ye, Guanhong, 2025. "Judicial independence and corporate ESG performance," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1789-1818.
    5. repec:hal:cdiwps:hal-05056150 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Joop Age Harm Adema & Cevat Giray Aksoy & Panu Poutvaara, 2021. "Mobile Internet Access and the Desire to Emigrate," ifo Working Paper Series 365, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    7. Garcia-Hombrados, Jorge & Perez Parra, Daniel & Ciacci, Riccardo, 2026. "Shifting the Value of Norms: Fast Internet, Premarital Sex and the Erosion of Female Genital Cutting," IZA Discussion Papers 18524, IZA Network @ LISER.
    8. Boeri, Filippo & Di Cataldo, Marco & Pietrostefani, Elisabetta, 2022. "Localised effects of re-allocated real estate mafia assets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116682, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Joaquín Artés & Juan Luis Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2023. "The effects of revealing the prosecution of political corruption on local finances," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 249-275, January.
    10. Anna Laura Baraldi, 2025. "Mafia and Political Competition Redirecting Votes not Discouraging Candidates," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 549-581, July.
    11. Duan, Li & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2026. "Awakening latent human capital: Economic opening up and entrepreneurship in 19th century China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    12. Di Cataldo, Marco & Romani, Giulia, 2024. "Rational cuts? The local impact of closing undersized schools," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    13. Ruffini, Krista & Öztürk, Orgül & Pekgün, Pelin, 2025. "In-kind government assistance and crowd-out of charitable services: Evidence from free school meals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 248(C).
    14. Pablo Slutzky & Stefan Zeume, 2024. "Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Antimafia Enforcement Actions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(10), pages 6569-6596, October.
    15. Di Cataldo, Marco & Renzullo, Elena & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés, 2026. "Cohesion or collusion? EU funds in places with corrupt local institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 245(C).
    16. Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Marco Quatrosi, 2025. "Go Green Without the Mafia! Dissolution of Infiltrated City Councils and Environmental Policy," Papers 2507.18410, arXiv.org.
    17. Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, 2022. "Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources [“Mafiaand Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 774-839.
    18. Bas Scheer & Wiljan van den Berge & Maarten Goos & Alan Manning & Anna Salomons, 2022. "Alternative Work Arrangements and Worker Outcomes: Evidence from Payrolling," CPB Discussion Paper 435, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    19. Mac Clay, Pablo & Börner, Jan & Sellare, Jorge, 2023. "Institutional and macroeconomic stability mediate the effect of auctions on renewable energy capacity," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    20. Catalina Amuedo‐Dorantes & Francisca M. Antman, 2022. "De facto immigration enforcement, ICE raid awareness, and worker engagement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(1), pages 373-391, January.
    21. D. Mark Anderson & Yang Liang & Joseph J. Sabia, 2024. "Mandatory seatbelt laws and traffic fatalities: A reassessment," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 513-521, April.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp26275. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michela Pozzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbbocit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.