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Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

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  • Andreoni,J.
  • Blanchard,E.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

Abstract

We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play. We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially difficult environment for learning subgame perfection. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Andreoni,J. & Blanchard,E., 2002. "Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200215
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Krawczyk, Michal & Le Lec, Fabrice, 2015. "Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 340-355.
    2. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    3. Hans-Theo Normann & Till Requate & Israel Waichman, 2014. "Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? A study of Cournot markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 371-390, September.
    4. Maruyama, Shiko, 2014. "Estimation of finite sequential games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 178(2), pages 716-726.
    5. Gautam Bose & Lorraine Ivancic & Evgenia Dechter, 2014. "Conforming to Group Norms: An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 2014-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    6. repec:bla:germec:v:18:y:2017:i:4:p:444-467 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler & Alexandra K. Zaby, 2017. "Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(4), pages 444-467, November.
    8. Vjollca Sadiraj & Juan Sun, 2012. "Efficiency in Bargaining Games with Alternating Offers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2366-2374.
    9. McCain, Roger A., 2008. "Cooperative games and cooperative organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2155-2167, December.
    10. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    11. McCain, Roger A., 2009. "Commitment and weakness of will in game theory and neoclassical economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 549-556, August.
    12. Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, 2010. "Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 263-287, May.
    13. Michał Krawczyk & Fabrice Le Lec, 2012. "Testing game theory without the social preference confound," Working Papers 2012-06, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    14. David Cooper & E. Dutcher, 2011. "The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 519-546, November.
    15. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2015. "Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 16-28.
    16. Ralph-C. Bayer, 2017. "The Double Dividend of Relative Auditing – Theory and Experiments on Corporate Tax Enforcement," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-14, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

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