Efficiency in Bargaining Games with Alternating Offers
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References listed on IDEAS
- James Andreoni & Emily Blanchard, 2006.
"Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games,"
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- Andreoni,J. & Blanchard,E., 2002. "Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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- James Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj & Ulrich Schmidt, 2015.
"Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(2), pages 215-250, June.
- Cox, James C. & Sadiraj, Vjollca & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2011. "Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk," Kiel Working Papers 1712, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj & Ulrich Schmidt, 2011. "Paradoxes and Mechanisms for Choice under Risk," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-07, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Oct 2013.
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:20-34 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kroll, Eike B. & Morgenstern, Ralf & Neumann, Thomas & Schosser, Stephan & Vogt, Bodo, 2014. "Bargaining power does not matter when sharing losses – Experimental evidence of equal split in the Nash bargaining game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 261-272.
- Paul J. Healy & Alexander L. Brown, 2016. "Separated Decisions," Working Papers 16-02, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsEfficiency; Bargaining; Experiments; Payoff Protocols;
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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