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Potentials and Weak Potentials in Acyclic and Weakly Acyclic Games

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  • Igal Milchtaich

Abstract

In a number of large, important families of finite games, not only is the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria nonempty but it is also reachable from any initial strategy profile by some sequence of myopic single-player moves to a better or best-reply strategy. This weak acyclicity property is weaker than acyclicity of the game, which requires every such sequence to reach an equilibrium. For example, all perfect-information extensive-form games are weakly acyclic, but they are generally not acyclic as even sequences of best-improvement steps may cycle. Weak acyclicity is equivalent to acyclicity of some priority rule, which is a rule that allows only some improvement moves. It is also equivalent to the existence of a weak potential, which unlike a potential increases along some rather than every sequence as above.

Suggested Citation

  • Igal Milchtaich, 2026. "Potentials and Weak Potentials in Acyclic and Weakly Acyclic Games," Papers 2608.25966, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.25966
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    References listed on IDEAS

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