IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-363128.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Potentials in Social Environments

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Demuynck
  • Jean-Jacques Herings
  • Christian Seel

Abstract

We develop and extend notions of potentials for normal-form games (Monderercand Shapley, 1996) to present a uniffied approach for the general class of social environments. The different potentials and corresponding social environments can be ordered in terms of their permissiveness. We classify different methods to construct potentials and we characterize potentials for specific examples such as matching problems, vote trading, multilateral trade, TU games, and various pillage games.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Christian Seel, 2023. "Potentials in Social Environments," Working Papers ECARES 2023-13, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/363128
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/363128/3/2023-13-DEMUYNCK_HERINGS_SEEL-potentials.pdf
    File Function: Œuvre complète ou partie de l'œuvre
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
    2. Martin Jensen, 2010. "Aggregative games and best-reply potentials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 45-66, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lina Mallozzi, 2013. "An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 21(3), pages 523-539, September.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Working Papers hal-04447373, HAL.
    3. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2016. "College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    4. Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 251-283, September.
    5. Abheek Ghosh & Paul W. Goldberg, 2023. "Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests," Papers 2305.10881, arXiv.org.
    6. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2013. "A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2737-2748.
    7. J. Puerto & F. Fernández & Y. Hinojosa, 2008. "Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 143-159, February.
    8. Christian Ewerhart, 2020. "Ordinal potentials in smooth games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(4), pages 1069-1100, November.
    9. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "Discounted Tree Solutions," Working Papers hal-01377923, HAL.
    10. Alexandre Skoda & Xavier Venel, 2022. "Weighted Average-convexity and Cooperative Games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22016, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    11. Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Economic theory and game theory 011, Nir Dagan.
    12. Walter Beckert, 2018. "An Empirical Analysis of Countervailing Power in Business-to-Business Bargaining," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 369-402, May.
    13. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
    14. David Schüller & Thorsten Upmann, 2013. "When Focal Points are Out of Focus: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Come Dine with Me," CESifo Working Paper Series 4138, CESifo.
    15. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ehlers, Lars & Kar, Anirban, 2010. "Externalities, potential, value and consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2380-2411, November.
    16. Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2015. "Potential, value, and the multilinear extension," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 28-30.
    17. Casajus, André, 2014. "Potential, value, and random partitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 164-166.
    18. Uttiya Paul & Tarun Sabarwal, 2023. "Directional monotone comparative statics in function spaces," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 153-169, April.
    19. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers 2007-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    20. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:70:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-228, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Potential games; social environments.;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/363128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/arulbbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.