Author
Abstract
We model the cadence of AI product releases, i.e. quiet spells, reversible patches, and rarer pivots, as optimal exercise of strategic real options under reputational learning. A privately observed technical state follows a diffusion. The firm controls two upgrade options with asymmetric costs and reversibility (a cheap patch and a costly pivot) and a publication-frequency clock, a Cox process whose intensity governs when noisy public performance and safety signals are disclosed. For sufficiently low clock costs the optimal policy posts observable clock-off windows around knife-edge regions. These windows shut down the martingale part of public beliefs, eliminate knife-edge mixing, and collapse behavior to a two-rung release ladder with endogenous triggers, jump targets, and no interior mixing. Within stationary Markov strategies we show that this ladder is uniquely characterized by a boundary-value system with value matching and smooth pasting at triggers and target optimality at jump targets. We endogenize market or platform adoption as a threshold rule in public beliefs and show that leverage creates an irreversibility wedge: the gap between first-best and levered surplus is bounded by the takeover switching cost of the least reversible rung. Patches are debt-insensitive; pivots can be distorted, but only up to that bound. The framework predicts telemetry signatures in firm-authored disclosures: a pre-release cadence dip in publication intensity and intra-month dispersion as the clock is shut off before a major reset; two post-release plateaus in disclosed performance, consistent with patch versus pivot jump targets; and debt-insensitive patch timing in high-reversibility regimes, with leverage effects concentrated in pivots. Unlike option-implied volatility spikes, these patterns reflect the firm's own throttling of technical signals rather than market pricing of event risk.
Suggested Citation
I. Sebastian Buhai, 2025.
"Real Option AI: Reversibility, Silence, and the Release Ladder,"
Papers
2511.16958, arXiv.org.
Handle:
RePEc:arx:papers:2511.16958
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2511.16958. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.