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MAD Chairs: A new tool to evaluate AI

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  • Chris Santos-Lang

Abstract

This paper contributes a new way to evaluate AI. Much as one might evaluate a machine in terms of its performance at chess, this approach involves evaluating a machine in terms of its performance at a game called "MAD Chairs". At the time of writing, evaluation with this game exposed opportunities to improve Claude, Gemini, ChatGPT, Qwen and DeepSeek. Furthermore, this paper sets a stage for future innovation in game theory and AI safety by providing an example of success with non-standard approaches to each: studying a game beyond the scope of previous game theoretic tools and mitigating a serious AI safety risk in a way that requires neither determination of values nor their enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Chris Santos-Lang, 2025. "MAD Chairs: A new tool to evaluate AI," Papers 2503.20986, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2503.20986
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalliopi Kastampolidou & Christos Papalitsas & Theodore Andronikos, 2022. "The Distributed Kolkata Paise Restaurant Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-21, April.
    2. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
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