IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

International cooperation and competition in orbit-use management


  • Aditya Jain
  • Akhil Rao


Orbit-use management efforts can be structured as binding national regulatory policies or as self-enforcing international treaties. New treaties to control space debris growth appear unlikely in the near future. Spacefaring nations can pursue national regulatory policies, though regulatory competition and open access to orbit make their effectiveness unclear. We develop a game-theoretic model of national regulatory policies and self-enforcing international treaties for orbit-use management in the face of open access, regulatory competition, and catastrophe. While open access limits the effectiveness of national policies, market-access control ensures the policies can improve environmental quality. A large enough stock of legacy debris ensures existence of a global regulatory equilibrium where all nations choose to levy environmental regulations on all satellites. The global regulatory equilibrium supports a self-enforcing treaty to avert catastrophe by making it costlier to leave the treaty and free ride.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Jain & Akhil Rao, 2022. "International cooperation and competition in orbit-use management," Papers 2205.03926,, revised Sep 2022.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2205.03926

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. World Bank & Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009. "The Sunken Billions : The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2596.
    2. Levinson, Arik, 2003. "Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evidence," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 56(1), pages 91-106, March.
    3. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
    4. Nodir Adilov & Peter Alexander & Brendan Cunningham, 2015. "An Economic Analysis of Earth Orbit Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 60(1), pages 81-98, January.
    5. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1984. "Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 87-98, March.
    6. Sébastien Rouillon, 2020. "A Physico-Economic Model of Low Earth Orbit Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(4), pages 695-723, December.
    7. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, 2012. "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(1 (Spring), pages 233-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sanz Labrador, Ismael & Sanz-Sanz, José Félix, 2013. "Política fiscal y crecimiento económico: consideraciones microeconómicas y relaciones macroeconómicas," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 134, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    2. Anelí Bongers & José L. Torres, 2021. "A dynamic investment model for satellites and orbital debris," Working Paper series 21-11, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    3. Millimet, Daniel L., 2013. "Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 7831, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Evans, Mary F. & Stafford, Sarah L., 2019. "The Clean Air Act Watch List and federal oversight of state enforcement efforts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 170-184.
    5. Fredriksson, Per G. & Wollscheid, Jim R., 2014. "Environmental decentralization and political centralization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 402-410.
    6. James Alm & H. Spencer Banzhaf, 2012. "Designing Economic Instruments For The Environment In A Decentralized Fiscal System," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 177-202, April.
    7. Böhringer, Christoph & Rivers, Nicholas & Yonezawa, Hidemichi, 2016. "Vertical fiscal externalities and the environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 51-74.
    8. Xiangfeng Ji & Muhammad Umar & Shahid Ali & Wajid Ali & Kai Tang & Zeeshan Khan, 2021. "Does fiscal decentralization and eco‐innovation promote sustainable environment? A case study of selected fiscally decentralized countries," Sustainable Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 79-88, January.
    9. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Banzhaf, H. Spencer & Chupp, B. Andrew, 2012. "Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities: New results and an application to US Air pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 449-464.
    11. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-479, June.
    12. Itziar Lazkano & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016. "Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 339-354.
    13. Wu, Haitao & Hao, Yu & Ren, Siyu, 2020. "How do environmental regulation and environmental decentralization affect green total factor energy efficiency: Evidence from China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    14. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang, 2020. "The politics of environmental enforcement: the case of the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(6), pages 2593-2613, June.
    15. Akhil Rao & Francesca Letizia, 2022. "An integrated debris environment assessment model," Papers 2205.05205,
    16. Sivagnanam, K. Jothi, 2007. "Poverty Reduction by Decentralisation: A Case for Rural Panchyats in Tamil Nadu," MPRA Paper 3210, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    18. Christian Schoder, 2012. "Effective demand, exogenous normal utilization and endogenous capacity in the long run. Evidence from a CVAR analysis for the US," IMK Working Paper 103-2012, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    19. Guy Michaels, 2011. "The Long Term Consequences of Resource‐Based Specialisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 31-57, March.
    20. Sangyup Choi & Davide Furceri & João Tovar Jalles, 2022. "Heterogeneous gains from countercyclical fiscal policy: new evidence from international industry-level data [Optimal investment with costly reversibility]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 773-804.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2205.03926. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.