Explaining Cost Overruns of Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects using a Signalling Game
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- I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn.
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- Brunes, Fredrik & Lind, Hans, 2014. "Explaining cost overruns in infrastructural projects: A new framework with applications to Sweden," Working Paper Series 14/1, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Centre for Banking and Finance (cefin).
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-07-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-NPS-2013-07-15 (Nonprofit & Public Sector)
- NEP-PPM-2013-07-15 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-TRE-2013-07-15 (Transport Economics)
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