A cost-benefit analysis of tunnel investment and tolling alternatives in Antwerp
This paper presents and illustrates a comprehensive and operational model for assessing transport pricing and investment policies and regulatory regimes. The approach encompasses intra-modal as well as inter-modal competition, and could be used either by private operators or by the legislator for the purpose of evaluating market conduct. The model combines elements of contract theory, public economics, political economy, transportation economics and game theory. It incorporates a CES-based discrete-choice framework in which user charges and infrastructure investments are endogenously determined for two competing alternatives (air, rail or two parallel roads) that may be used for transportation of passengers and/or freight. The model includes separate modules for demand, supply, equilibrium and the regulatory framework. The demand module for passenger transport features a CES decision tree with three levels: choice between transport and consumption of a composite commodity, choice between peak and off-peak periods, and choice between the two transport alternatives. Elasticities of substitution at each level are parametrically given. Passengers can be segmented into classes that differ with respect to their travel preferences, incomes and costs of travel time. The demand module for freight transport also features three levels. The first level encompasses choice between transport and other production inputs, and the second and third levels are the same as for passenger transport. Freight transport can be segmented into local and transit traffic. The supply module specifies for each transport alternative travel time as a function of traffic volume and a rule for infrastructure maintenance. Operating, maintenance and investment costs are allowed to depend on the contractual form. Given the demand and supply functions, the equilibrium module computes a fixed-point solution in terms of prices and levels of congestion. Finally, the exogenous regulatory framework stipulates
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|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2005|
|Note:||In : European Transport/Trasporti Europei, 31, 83-100, 2005|
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- Arnott, Richard & Kraus, Marvin, 1998.
"When are anonymous congestion charges consistent with marginal cost pricing?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 45-64, January.
- Richard Arnott & Marvin Kraus, 1994. "When Are Anonymous Congestion Charges Consistent with Marginal Cost Pricing?," NBER Technical Working Papers 0154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard Arnott & Marvin Kraus, 1997. "When are Anonymous Congestion Charges Consistent with Marginal Cost Pricing?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 354., Boston College Department of Economics.
- Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost (ed.), 2001. "Reforming Transport Pricing in the European Union," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1822.
- Small, Kenneth A. & Gomez-Ilbanez, Jose A., 1998. "Road Pricing for Congestion Management: The Transition from Theory to Policy," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt8kk909p1, University of California Transportation Center.
- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner, 2003. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD Countries. Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation," CESifo Working Paper Series 935, CESifo Group Munich.