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Regra de Taylor e Política Monetária em Condições de Endividamento Público no Brasil

Author

Listed:
  • Cleomar Gomes

    (UFU)

  • Márcio Holland

    (UFU)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze, empirically, the relationship between the Central Bank’s reaction, also known as Taylor Rule, and the Brazilian public debt. The article is justified once the majority of the researches regarding the Brazilian reaction function doesn’t model the public debt. Our results show that when the Central Bank increases the interest rate, it manages to decrease inflation and the GDP growth. However, these impacts are smoothed by the increase of the debt/GDP and, as a result, by the probability of default. The latter, better than explaining higher interest rates, is explained by them .
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cleomar Gomes & Márcio Holland, 2003. "Regra de Taylor e Política Monetária em Condições de Endividamento Público no Brasil," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31st Brazilian Economics Meeting] b44, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2003:b44
    as

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    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2003/artigos/B44.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models

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