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Differences In The Transaction Costs Of Strategies To Control Agricultural Chemical Offsite And Undersite Damages

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  • Easter, K. William

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  • Easter, K. William, 1991. "Differences In The Transaction Costs Of Strategies To Control Agricultural Chemical Offsite And Undersite Damages," Staff Papers 13421, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umaesp:13421
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.13421
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/13421/files/p91-42.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Porter, Richard C., 1988. "Environmental negotiation: Its potential and its economic efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 129-142, June.
    2. Cox, Craig A. & Easter, K. William, 1990. "A Regional Ban Of Alachlor And Atrazine In Southeastern Minnesota: The Economic And Environmental Effects," Staff Papers 13945, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    3. Easter, K. William & Cotner, Melvin L., 1981. "Evaluation Of Current Soil Conservation Strategies," Staff Papers 13359, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    4. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    5. Rodgers, Charles & Easter, K. William & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1990. "The Off-Site Economic Benefits Of Soil Conservation: A Review And Discussion Of Recent Literature On The Recreational Demand For Water Quality Improvement," Staff Papers 13504, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    7. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    8. Segerson, Kathleen, 1990. "Liability for groundwater contamination from pesticides," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-243, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. McCann, Laura M.J., 1999. "Induced Institutional Innovation in Response to Transaction Costs: The Case of the National Native Title Tribunal," 1999 Conference (43th), January 20-22, 1999, Christchurch, New Zealand 123852, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. McCann, Laura M.J., 2000. "Evolution of Agri-Environmental Policy in the United States," 2000 Conference (44th), January 23-25, 2000, Sydney, Australia 171921, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    3. McCann, Laura M.J., 2001. "Transaction Costs of Agri-Environmental Policies in Vietnam," 2001 Conference (45th), January 23-25, 2001, Adelaide, Australia 125787, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    4. McCann, Laura M.J. & Easter, K. William, 1998. "Estimating Transaction Costs Of Alternative Policies To Reduce Phosphorous Pollution In The Minnesota River," Staff Papers 13919, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    5. McCann, Laura & Colby, Bonnie & Easter, K. William & Kasterine, Alexander & Kuperan, K.V., 2005. "Transaction cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 527-542, March.

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