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Power In Legislative Bargaining: Theoretical Conception And Empirical Appliation To The European Union

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  • Henning, Christian H.C.A.

Abstract

Theoretical conception and empirical application to the European Union

Suggested Citation

  • Henning, Christian H.C.A., 2002. "Power In Legislative Bargaining: Theoretical Conception And Empirical Appliation To The European Union," Working Paper Series 24408, University of Kiel, Chair of Agricultural Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ukiewp:24408
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24408
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2001. "Myths and Meanings of Voting Power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 81-97, January.
    4. Blin, Jean-Marie & Satterthwaite, Mark A, 1977. "On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 881-888, May.
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