IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/buspol/v4y2002i02p187-203_00.html

Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Author

Listed:
  • Bennedsen, Morten
  • Feldmann, Sven E.

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems—the vote of confidence procedure—reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2002. "Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:02:p:187-203_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1369525800000632/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
    2. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    3. Jan Klingelhöfer, 2019. "Lobbying And Elections," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. Klingelhöfer, Jan, 2013. "Lobbying and Elections," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79722, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. David P. Baron, 2002. "Review of Grossman and Helpman's Special Interest Politics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1221-1229, December.
    6. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:02:p:187-203_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/bap .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.