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Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Author

Listed:
  • Bennedsen Morten

    (Copenhagen Business School & University of Chicago)

  • Feldmann Sven E.

    (Copenhagen Business School & University of Chicago)

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems--the vote of confidence procedure--reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennedsen Morten & Feldmann Sven E., 2002. "Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-18, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:2:n:6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Meissner, Joern & Senicheva, Olga V., 2018. "Approximate dynamic programming for lateral transshipment problems in multi-location inventory systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, pages 49-64.
    3. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," Working Papers 07-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:03:p:611-621_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
    6. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Informational Lobbying And Political Contributions," Working Papers 08-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    7. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:33-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 631-656.
    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:02:p:303-315_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 299-316.
    2. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 631-656.
    3. Klingelhöfer, Jan, 2013. "Lobbying and Elections," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79722, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Informational Lobbying And Political Contributions," Working Papers 08-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    5. David P. Baron, 2002. "Review of Grossman and Helpman's Special Interest Politics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1221-1229.
    6. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    7. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

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