Political Foundation Of Economically Inefficient Public Policies: The Case Of The Common European Agricultural Policy
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December.
- Blin, Jean-Marie & Satterthwaite, Mark A, 1977. "On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 881-88, May.
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