IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iffpr5/42345.html

Decentralization, Local Government Elections and Voter Turnout in Pakistan

Author

Listed:
  • Akramov, Kamiljon T.
  • Qureshi, Sarfraz
  • Birner, Regina
  • Khan, Bilal Hasan

Abstract

Decentralization has the potential to improve the accountability of government and lead to a more efficient provision of public services. However, accountability requires broad groups of people to participate in local government. Thus, voter turnout at local government elections is an important component of government accountability. This study used survey data on the 2005 local government elections in Pakistan to analyze the impact of electoral mechanisms, the credibility of elections, and voters’ socioeconomic characteristics on voter turnout. The rational-choice perspective is applied to develop the specifications of the empirical model. The empirical analysis is based on a series of standard and multilevel random-intercept logistic models. Our important findings reveal that (1) voter turnout is strongly associated with the personal and social gratifications people derive from voting; (2) the preference-matching ability of candidates for local government positions is marginal; and (3) the introduction of direct elections of the district nazims—a key position in local government—might improve electoral participation and thus create a precondition for better local government accountability. The findings also suggest that less educated people, farmers, and rural people are more likely to vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Akramov, Kamiljon T. & Qureshi, Sarfraz & Birner, Regina & Khan, Bilal Hasan, 2008. "Decentralization, Local Government Elections and Voter Turnout in Pakistan," IFPRI Discussion Papers 42345, CGIAR, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iffpr5:42345
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.42345
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/42345/files/IFPRIDP00754.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.42345?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee (ed.), 2006. "Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524546, December.
    2. Crook,Richard C. & Manor,James, 1998. "Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521636476.
    3. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
    4. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
    5. Khemani, Stuti, 2004. "Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-154, February.
    6. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3250, The World Bank.
    7. repec:wbk:wbpubs:7192 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    9. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    10. Jennings, M. Kent, 1997. "Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 361-372, June.
    11. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:01:p:25-42_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:02:p:411-425_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:1:p:25-42_1 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
    15. Crook,Richard C. & Manor,James, 1998. "Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521631570.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Akramov, Kamiljon T. & Qureshi, Sarfraz & Birner, Regina & Khan, Bilal Hasan, 2008. "Decentralization, local government elections and voter turnout in Pakistan," IFPRI discussion papers 754, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Dilip Mookherjee, 2014. "Accountability of local and state governments in India: an overview of recent research," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 7(1), pages 12-41, April.
    3. Lankina, Tomila, 2008. "Cross-Cutting Literature Review on the Drivers of Local Council Accountability and Performance," MPRA Paper 12408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Susan Steiner, 2005. "Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework for the Economic Impact," Public Economics 0508006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Fernando Albornoz & Antonio Cabrales, 2010. "Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process," Working Papers 2010-02, FEDEA.
    6. Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2006. "Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 303-327, April.
    7. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Dahmani-Scuitti, Anaïs, 2025. "Decentralization in Autocraties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    8. Yu-Bong Lai, 2016. "Does Tax Competition Reduce Corruption?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(4), pages 331-356, September.
    9. Antonio Farfan-Vallespin, 2012. "Decentralization as Unbundling of Public Goods Provision - New Effects of Decentralization on Efficiency and Electoral Control," Discussion Paper Series 21, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Nov 2012.
    10. Westphal, Nico, 2011. "Political Decentralisation and Local Economic Development: Findings on the pro-poor responsiveness in 5 Cambodian communes," IEE Working Papers 193, Ruhr University Bochum, Institute of Development Research and Development Policy (IEE).
    11. Teferi Mergo & Alain-Désiré Nimubona & Horatiu Alin Rus, 2023. "Ethnically asymmetric political representation and the provision of public goods: theory and evidence from Ethiopia," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 519-547, December.
    12. Toke S. Aidt & Jayasri Dutta, 2017. "Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 38-58, February.
    13. Juan Luis Gómez-Reino & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2013. "An international perspective on the determinants of local government fragmentation," Chapters, in: Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Challenge of Local Government Size, chapter 2, pages 8-54, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. David Bartolini & Agnese Sacchi & Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro, 2018. "The closer the better? Institutional distance and information blurring in a political agency model," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 146, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    15. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
    16. Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 705-727, April.
    17. Joanis, Marcelin, 2014. "Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 28-37.
    18. Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.
    19. Albornoz, Facundo & Cabrales, Antonio, 2013. "Decentralization, political competition and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 103-111.
    20. Juan Luis Gómez‐Reino & Santiago Lago‐Peñas & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez, 2023. "Evidence on economies of scale in local public service provision: A meta‐analysis," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 793-819, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iffpr5:42345. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.