Agricultural Farm Income and competitiveness of the tax and insurance systems
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.207401
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998.
"Tax Compliance,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Baldwin, Richard E. & Krugman, Paul, 2004.
"Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-23, February.
- Krugman, Paul & Baldwin, Richard, 2000. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 2002. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 9290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard Baldwin; Paul Krugman, 2001. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," IHEID Working Papers 01-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Czyżewski, Bazyli, 2016. "Political Rents of European Farmers in the Sustainable Development Paradigm. International, national and regional perspective," MPRA Paper 74253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 213-232, February.
- Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007.
"With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," CREMA Working Paper Series 2007-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Cyril Chalendard, 2015.
"Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting,"
Working Papers
halshs-01179445, HAL.
- Cyril CHALENDARD, 2015. "Use of Internal Information, External Information Acquisition and Customs Underreporting," Working Papers 201522, CERDI.
- Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Kocher, 2013.
"Tax compliance under tax regime changes,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 225-246, April.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Kocher, Martin G., 2010. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-020, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Kocher, Martin G., 2010. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," Discussion Papers in Economics 11443, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Kocher, Martin G., 2013. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," Munich Reprints in Economics 18179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Goerke, Laszlo, 2013.
"Relative consumption and tax evasion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 52-65.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2013. "Relative Consumption and Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 4077, CESifo.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2013. "Relative Consumption and Tax Evasion," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201301, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
- Annette Alstadsæter & Wojciech Kopczuk & Kjetil Telle, 2019.
"Social networks and tax avoidance: evidence from a well-defined Norwegian tax shelter,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(6), pages 1291-1328, December.
- Annette Alstadsæter & Wojciech Kopczuk & Kjetil Telle, 2018. "Social Networks and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from a Well-Defined Norwegian Tax Shelter," NBER Working Papers 25191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Annette Alstadsæter & Wojciech Kopczuk & Kjetil Telle, 2018. "Social networks and tax avoidance. Evidence from a well-defined Norwegian tax shelter," Discussion Papers 886, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Kopczuk, Wojciech & Alstadsæter, Annette & Telle, Kjetil, 2018. "Social networks and tax avoidance: Evidence from a well-defined Norwegian tax shelter," CEPR Discussion Papers 13251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Arun Advani, 2022.
"Who does and doesn't pay taxes?,"
Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(1), pages 5-22, March.
- Advani, Arun, 2020. "Who does and doesn’t pay taxes?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1321, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Advani, Arun, 2020. "Who does and doesn’t pay taxes?," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 530, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Ronconi, Lucas & Zarazaga S.J., Rodrigo, 2015.
"Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities,"
World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 453-461.
- Ronconi, Lucas & Zarazaga, Rodrigo, 2015. "Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6828, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016.
"Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(330), pages 219-246, April.
- Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries," NBER Working Papers 15218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen & Kreiner, Claus Thustrup & Saez, Emmanuel, 2016. "Why can modern governments tax so much? An agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:idq:ictduk:13726 is not listed on IDEAS
- Casal, Sandro & Mittone, Luigi, 2016.
"Social esteem versus social stigma: The role of anonymity in an income reporting game,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 55-66.
- Sandro Casal & Luigi Mittone, 2014. "Social Esteem versus Social Stigma: the role of anonymity in an income reporting game," CEEL Working Papers 1401, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Semjén, András, 2017. "Az adózói magatartás különféle magyarázatai [Various explanations for tax compliance]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 140-184.
- Traxler, Christian, 2010.
"Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 89-103, March.
- Traxler, Christian, 2006. "Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers," Discussion Papers in Economics 1202, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Angel Solano García, 2015. "Tax Morale with Partisan Parties," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 213(2), pages 83-108, June.
- Cécile Bazart & Michael Pickhardt, 2009. "Fighting Income Tax Evasion with Positive Rewards: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 09-01, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2009.
- Orviska, Marta & Hudson, John, 2003. "Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 83-102, March.
- Berger, Melissa & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Sausgruber, Rupert & Traxler, Christian, 2016.
"Higher taxes, more evasion? Evidence from border differentials in TV license fees,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 74-86.
- Berger, Melissa & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Sausgruber, Rupert & Traxler, Christian, 2015. "Higher taxes, more evasion? Evidence from border differentials in TV license fees," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-008, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Melissa Berger & Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2015. "Higher Taxes, More Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentials in TV License Fees," CESifo Working Paper Series 5195, CESifo.
- Mirco Tonin, 2014. "Reporting import tariffs (and other taxes)," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(1), pages 153-173, February.
- Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2007.
"Tax evasion and social interactions,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2089-2112, December.
- Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," Post-Print halshs-00175016, HAL.
- Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," Post-Print halshs-00180104, HAL.
- Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-61, CIRANO.
- Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Marie Claire Villeval, 2007. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," Post-Print halshs-00238448, HAL.
- Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," Cahiers de recherche 0432, CIRPEE.
- Marie-Claire Villeval & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2005. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," Working Papers 0410, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 1359, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Kalina Koleva, 2005. "Seeking for an optimal tax administration: the efficiency costs’ approach [A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience]," Post-Print halshs-00195354, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Agricultural and Food Policy; Financial Economics; International Development;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2015-08-25 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-AGR-2015-08-25 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2015-08-25 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2015-08-25 (Public Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iafepr:207401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ierigpl.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.