IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iaae15/212274.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Firm Organizational and Payoff Imbalances: An Aggrievement Model with Cooperatives and Private Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Schamel, Guenter H.
  • Santos-Arteaga, Francisco J.

Abstract

Firm Organizational and Payoff Imbalances: An Aggrievement Model with Cooperatives and Private Firms

Suggested Citation

  • Schamel, Guenter H. & Santos-Arteaga, Francisco J., 2015. "Firm Organizational and Payoff Imbalances: An Aggrievement Model with Cooperatives and Private Firms," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 212274, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae15:212274
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.212274
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/212274/files/Schamel-Firm%20Organizational%20and%20Payoff%20Imbalances-1230.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.212274?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    2. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Scope," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(2), pages 483-513.
    3. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Scope," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(2), pages 483-513.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall.
    7. Alain Cohn & Ernst Fehr & Benedikt Herrmann & Frédéric Schneider, 2014. "Social Comparison And Effort Provision: Evidence From A Field Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 877-898, August.
    8. Sexton, Richard J. & Lavoie, Nathalie, 2001. "Food processing and distribution: An industrial organization approach," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 863-932, Elsevier.
    9. Bontems, Philippe & Fulton, Murray, 2009. "Organizational structure, redistribution and the endogeneity of cost: Cooperatives, investor-owned firms and the cost of procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 322-343, October.
    10. Bartling, Björn & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2010. "The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 598-607, June.
    11. Alan S. Blinder & Don H. Choi, 1990. "A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 1003-1015.
    12. George W. J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman, 2001. "Marketing Co‐operatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 53-64, January.
    13. Faulkender, Michael & Yang, Jun, 2010. "Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 257-270, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Contreras Oscar F. & Giorgio Zanarone, 2018. "Managing Social Comparison Costs in Organizations," Working Papers 2018-25, Banco de México.
    2. Maloney, Michael T., 2017. "Alchian remembrances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 561-582.
    3. Christian Koch, 2021. "Can reference points explain wage rigidity? Experimental evidence," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 55(1), pages 1-17, December.
    4. Göller, Daniel, 2021. "How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224598, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, revised 2021.
    5. Hart, Oliver D., 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Scholarly Articles 29058539, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Erlei, Mathias & Reinhold, Christian, 2016. "Contracts as reference points—The role of reciprocity effects and signaling effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 133-145.
    7. Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2015. "Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(1), pages 297-332.
    8. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
    9. Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Müller, Daniel, 2018. "Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 176-201.
    10. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    11. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
    12. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2022. "Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3604-3624, May.
    13. Anjos, Fernando, 2016. "Resource configuration, inter-firm networks, and organizational performance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 37-48.
    14. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    15. Dessein, Wouter, 2012. "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Davidson Heath & Mark Mitchell, 2023. "Market Returns and Interim Risk in Mergers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 617-635, January.
    17. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2015. "How Do Informal Agreements And Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 1-28, February.
    18. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    19. Björn Bartling & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2015. "Reference Points, Social Norms, And Fairness In Contract Renegotiations," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 98-129, February.
    20. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agribusiness; Agricultural Finance;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iaae15:212274. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iaaeeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.