Antitrust Economic Analysis in Food Marketing Channels
Antitrust laws, or alternatively competition laws, are now in place in over 100 nations. (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 12). Many countries have enacted such since 1990 with China’s coming on line in 1994 (Brumfield 2005) and formally codified as an antimonopoly law in 2007 (Blumenthal, et. al., 2007). Globally there has been considerable convergence in content and enforcement. This has been especially true over the past ten years. Virtually every country has antitrust statutes regarding monopoly, mergers, and cartels. The economics underpinning these laws are common across all countries. Enforcement procedures, however, vary with significant implications for antitrust economic analysis.
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