Short-Term Changes in Land Access in the Senegal Groundnut Basin

Households in Senegal’s Groundnut Basin allocate land among members, but how last year’s productivity guides this year’s allocation is unclear. Using collective household model, we argue that heads update each member’s bargaining power after seeing recent harvests and then adjust the amount and quality of land received, though social rules restrain full change. Previous studies documented productivity gaps but treated bargaining power as exogenous, missing how productivity itself shapes bargaining power. We test our claim with panel data on 7,604 individuals in 1,123 households surveyed in 2020–2021. A Heckman-corrected IV design instruments 2019 yields with rainfall and heat to predict 2020 land access, area, plot count, and a NDVI-based measure of land quality. We add household heads’ own size estimates to capture how land size perceptions may lead choices. Findings show that higher measured yields raise the chance of receiving land as well as the number of plots received, and plot quality. Further, the effects nearly double when the head’s perceived yields are used instead of measured yields. Efficiency improves over time, but gaps in gender, age, and information access remain. Policies that boost yields while protecting disadvantaged members can raise both fairness and agricultural output.