Cooperative Growth and Decline: A Game Theoretic Approach to Understanding Members' Allocation Choices
In the present research, the agent's choice to leave or join a cooperative is modeled to be a function of alternative investment opportunities and choices made by other agents who are faced with an identical set of possible strategies. Once the agent has made the decision to join a cooperative, the agent may reevaluate available alternatives in each period. The result is a multi-period repeated game in which the growth or decline of a cooperative is determined.
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