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Cooperative Growth and Decline: A Game Theoretic Approach to Understanding Members' Allocation Choices

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  • Bond, Jennifer Keeling

Abstract

In the present research, the agent's choice to leave or join a cooperative is modeled to be a function of alternative investment opportunities and choices made by other agents who are faced with an identical set of possible strategies. Once the agent has made the decision to join a cooperative, the agent may reevaluate available alternatives in each period. The result is a multi-period repeated game in which the growth or decline of a cooperative is determined.

Suggested Citation

  • Bond, Jennifer Keeling, 2006. "Cooperative Growth and Decline: A Game Theoretic Approach to Understanding Members' Allocation Choices," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21279, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea06:21279
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21279
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robin Cross & Steven Buccola, 2004. "Adapting Cooperative Structure to the New Global Environment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1254-1261.
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    4. Staatz, John M., 1987. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation," Journal of Agricultural Cooperation, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, vol. 2, pages 1-22.
    5. Oakland, William H., 1972. "Congestion, public goods and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 339-357, November.
    6. Keeling Bond, Jennifer J., 2004. "Lessons in Cooperative Failure: The Rice Growers Association Experience," 2004 Annual Meeting, November 2-3 31796, NCERA-194 Research on Cooperatives.
    7. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    8. Keeling Bond, Jennifer J. & Carter, Colin A., 2004. "Lessons in Failure: The Rice Growers Association Cooperative," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20036, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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    Cited by:

    1. Maxime Agbo & Damien Rousselière & Julien Salanié, 2013. "A theory of agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling," Post-Print halshs-00949726, HAL.
    2. Agbo, Maxime & Rousselière, Damien & Salanié, Julien, 2015. "Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 56-71.
    3. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01098762 is not listed on IDEAS

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