Static And Dynamic Efficiency Of Pooled Broiler Contracts: Relative-Performance Contracts Vs. Fixed-Performance Contracts
With the broiler industry as a backdrop, this paper develops theoretical models to compare optimal incentives of pooled relative-performance and fixed-performance contracts in static and dynamic models that account for both adverse selection and moral hazard. In spite of some growers' complaints about the relative-performance contracts used in the broiler industry, model results largely justify the popularity and superiority of relative performance contracts relative to fixed performance contracts
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