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Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis


  • Paul Pezanis-Christou

    () (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

  • Werner Guth

    () (LUISS, 32 Viale Romania, 00197 Rome, Italy. Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, 9-11 Sonnemann St., 60314 Frankfurt, Germany. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 10 Kurt-Schumacher St., 53113 Bonn, Germany.)


The risk-neutral equilibrium bidding strategy for first-price auctions with independent private values is justified without assuming a well-defined Bayesian game. Bidders, aware of their own value, assume the private values to be linearly related. The latter, however, are independent and identically distributed, and this is only known by Nature. Allowing for arbitrary linear common value beliefs, and assuming optimal bidding for such beliefs we derive the unique evolutionarily stable conjectural belief and justify risk neutral bidding in a new and hopefully innovative way.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Guth, 2015. "Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-13, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2015-13

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2014. "Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (I): Fixed and random matching," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 97-111.
    3. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen, 1997. "A new justification of monopolistic competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-182, December.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(7), pages 486-502, March.
    6. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(5), pages 320-334, January.
    7. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Güth, 2018. "An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games," School of Economics Working Papers 2018-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    2. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2017. "A Naïve Approach to Bidding," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    3. Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Güth & Marcello Puca & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2017. "Group Influence in Sharing Experiments," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 050, University of Siena.
    4. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    5. Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2017. "An evolutionary analysis of bidding behaviour in fair division games," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    More about this item


    Evolutionarily stable strategy; indirect evolution; first-price auction; independent private values; symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium.;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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