Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.027
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- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Guth, 2015. "Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-13, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen, 1997. "A new justification of monopolistic competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-182, December.
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Cited by:
- Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2021.
"An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 63-74, March.
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Güth, 2018. "An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2018-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2017. "An evolutionary analysis of bidding behaviour in fair division games," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2017. "A Naïve Approach to Bidding," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Güth & Marcello Puca & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2017. "Group Influence in Sharing Experiments," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 050, University of Siena.
- Jeannette Brosig-Koch & Werner Güth & Torsten Weiland, 2016. "Comparing the effectiveness of collusion devices in first-price procurement: an auction experiment," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 269-295, December.
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
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More about this item
Keywords
Evolutionarily stable strategy; Indirect evolution; First-price auction; Independent private values; Symmetric risk neutral equilibrium bidding;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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