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An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

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  • Paul Pezanis-Christou

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (Bonn) and LUISS (Rome))

Abstract

We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incomplete information in an evolutionary setup by postulating (i) minimal common knowledge assumptions, (ii) optimally responding agents to conjectural beliefs about how others behave and (iii) evolution of conjectural beliefs with fitness measured by expected payoffs. We axiomatically justify the game forms, derive the evolutionary games for first- and second-price fair division and determine the evolutionarily stable conjectures. The latter coincide with equilibrium bidding, irrespectively of the number of bidders, i.e., heuristic belief adaptation implies the same bidding behavior as equilibrium analysis based on common knowledge and counterfactual bids.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pezanis-Christou & Werner Güth, 2018. "An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games," School of Economics Working Papers 2018-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2018-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

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