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Inspection, Compliance and Violation: A Case of Fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • Kofi Otumawu-Apreku

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

The presence of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing activities is considered a serious barrier to the sustainable use of marine resources. This paper uses a game theoretic approach to investigate the strategic interaction between fishers and management in the presence of IUU fishing. Managers choose a combination of fines, inspection probabilities and whether to classify a firm as group 1 or group 2, to induce a target level of compliance from fishers who choose whether or not to comply. Importantly, this paper finds that equilibrium compliance strategies of fishers affect stock levels over time. In particular, even using less than perfect monitoring and enforcement can lower illegal harvesting, which is beneficial for stocks. The paper further shows that increasing the cost of engaging in illegal activities, through punishment, may be a sound economic policy. The results, however, suggest that the punishment should be bounded in order to achieve the purpose for which it is intended.

Suggested Citation

  • Kofi Otumawu-Apreku, 2013. "Inspection, Compliance and Violation: A Case of Fisheries," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-12
    as

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    File URL: https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2013-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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