Inspection, Compliance and Violation: A Case of Fisheries
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- Kofi Otumawu-Apreku, 2013. "Inspection, Compliance and Violation: A Case of Fisheries," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-17, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Harford, Jon D., 2000. "Initial and Continuing Compliance and the Trade-Off between Monitoring and Control Cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 151-163, September.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harford, Jon D., 1991. "Measurement error and state-dependent pollution control enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-81, July.
- Gallic, Bertrand Le & Cox, Anthony, 2006. "An economic analysis of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing: Key drivers and possible solutions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 689-695, November.
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- Christopher Costello & John Lynham & Sarah E. Lester & Steven D. Gaines, 2010. "Economic Incentives and Global Fisheries Sustainability," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 299-318, October.
- Gibson, Clark C. & Williams, John T. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2005. "Local Enforcement and Better Forests," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 273-284, February.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
- Eckert, Heather, 2004. "Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 232-259, March.
More about this item
KeywordsIUU fishing; game theoretic approach; inspection; violation and compliance; punishment; fish biomass; sustainability;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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