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Disliking to disagree: Implications of disagreement aversion for information disclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Kiryl Khalmetski

    (New Economic School)

  • Mark T. Le Quement

    (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)

  • Florian Hoffmann

    (Faculty of Economics and Business KU Leuven)

Abstract

We formalize the notion of belief homophily under asymmetric information by introducing a preference for perceived disagreement aversion. We study its implications for information sharing in a disclosure model where a privately informed sender and an uninformed receiver have heterogeneous priors, while the sender is averse to the receiver’s perceived disagreement. Equilibrium disclosure is partial and tends to confirm the prior mean of the more confident player. The receiver earns more from senders whose prior means differ more from his own but whose prior variances are more similar. Perceived disagreement aversion implies qualitatively reverse predictions than aversion to actual disagreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Kiryl Khalmetski & Mark T. Le Quement & Florian Hoffmann, 2026. "Disliking to disagree: Implications of disagreement aversion for information disclosure," Working Papers w0293, New Economic School (NES).
    • Handle: RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0293
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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