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Public Sector Union Growth and Bargaining Laws : A Proportional Hazards Approach with Time-Varying Treatments

In: When Public Sector Workers Unionize


  • Casey Ichniowski


This study uses a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate ther elationship between state-level collective bargaining policies and union growth in the public sector. The proportional hazards analysisis performed with data on approximately eight hundred municipal police departments. The timing of unionization in these departments clearly indicates that unionization rarely precedes the enactment of a statute. Where bargaining laws have not been enacted, formal collective bargaining between municipalities and their police is virtually nonexistant. Moreover, the proportional hazards analysis that controls for the effects of other state-level and municipal-level covariates indicates that the bargaining laws and policies are the most important determinant of unionization among police. Among different types of bargaining policies, "duty-to-bargain" provisions lead to higher unionization rates than do statutes that permit, but do not require, employers to bargain with police. However, after controlling for for the effects of other covariates, there appears to be no difference in the unionization rates between the states that have duty-to-bargain provisions along with an interest arbitration mechanism and those states that have duty-to-bargain provisions without such a dispute resolution mechanism.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Casey Ichniowski, 1988. "Public Sector Union Growth and Bargaining Laws : A Proportional Hazards Approach with Time-Varying Treatments," NBER Chapters,in: When Public Sector Workers Unionize, pages 19-40 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7902

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peter Feuille & John Thomas Delaney, 1986. "Collective Bargaining, Interest Arbitration, and Police Salaries," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(2), pages 228-240, January.
    2. Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski & Harrison Lauer, 1985. "Collective Bargaining Laws and Threat Effects of Unionism in the Determination of Police Compenstation," NBER Working Papers 1578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. William N. Cooke, 1983. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Union Certification Elections," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 36(3), pages 402-414, April.
    4. Freeman, Richard B, 1986. "Unionism Comes to the Public Sector," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 41-86, March.
    5. Gregory M. Saltzman, 1985. "Bargaining Laws as a Cause and Consequence of the Growth of Teacher Unionism," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 38(3), pages 335-351, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Tracy, 1988. "Comparisons Between Public and Private Sector Union Wage Differentials: Does the Legal Environment Matter?," NBER Working Papers 2755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pc:p:3573-3630 is not listed on IDEAS

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