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Goksel Asan

Personal Details

First Name:Goksel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Asan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pas135

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies)
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University)

İstanbul, Turkey
http://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr/




RePEc:edi:msbiltr (more details at EDIRC)

İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi (Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences)
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University)

İstanbul, Turkey
http://www.bilgi.edu.tr/tr/programlar-ve-okullar/lisans/iktisadi-ve-idari-bilimler-fakultesi/



Dolapdere Campus, Kurtulusderesi Cad. No: 47, 34440, Dolapdere, Istanbul
RePEc:edi:deibitr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
  2. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?," AMSE Working Papers 1643, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Powers, R.C., 2010. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 12-14, January.
    3. Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
    4. Nicolas Houy, 2007. "A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-8.
    5. Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "A characterization for qualified majority voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 17-24, July.
    6. Hoots, Lucas & Powers, Robert C., 2015. "Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 9-14.
    7. Can, Burak & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "Stereotype formation as trait aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 226-237, September.
    8. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
    9. Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2019. "Monotonicity and qualified majority rules," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 209-220, December.
    10. Núñez Matias & Valleta Giacomo, 2012. "The information simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    11. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2010. "Strategy-proofness and weighted voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 15-23, July.
    12. Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2008. "Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 108-110, July.
    13. Matías Núñez & Giacomo Valletta, 2015. "The informational basis of scoring rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 279-297, December.
    14. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
    15. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
    16. Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2010. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 57-60, July.
    17. M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.

  2. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Miroiu, 2013. "Responsiveness axioms and the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 740-746.
    2. Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?," AMSE Working Papers 1643, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    3. Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June.
    4. Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
    5. Hoots, Lucas & Powers, Robert C., 2015. "Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 9-14.
    6. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
    7. Sanne Zwart, 2010. "Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 643-677, April.
    8. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
    9. Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The Majority Rule with Arbitrators," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 321-330, March.
    10. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
    11. Núñez Matias & Valleta Giacomo, 2012. "The information simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Marchant, Thierry, 2007. "An axiomatic characterization of different majority concepts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 160-173, May.
    13. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 10-12.
    14. Antonio Quesada, 2012. "A short step between democracy and dictatorship," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 149-166, February.
    15. Yi, Jianxin, 2005. "A complete characterization of majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 109-112, April.
    16. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
    17. Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The majority rule with a chairman," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 679-691, March.
    18. Alcantud, José Carlos R., 2019. "Yet another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 52-55.
    19. Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-43.
    20. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
    21. Emre Doğan & M. Sanver, 2008. "Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 495-506, April.
    22. Matías Núñez & Giacomo Valletta, 2015. "The informational basis of scoring rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 279-297, December.
    23. Quesada, Antonio, 2011. "Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 151-154, May.
    24. Quesada, Antonio, 2010. "Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 149-153, September.
    25. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2011. "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 272-273, March.
    26. José Luis Garcí a-Lapresta & Bonifacio Llamazares, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Support Between Alternatives," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 527-542, November.
    27. Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Decision by majority and the right to vote," MPRA Paper 19400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    28. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
    29. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
    30. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 211-219, August.
    31. F. McMorris & R. Powers, 2008. "The majority decision function for trees with 3 leaves," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 169-175, October.
    32. McMorris, F.R. & Powers, R.C., 2013. "Majority decision on median semilattices," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 48-51.
    33. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
    34. M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.

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