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Publications

by alumni of

Humboldt-Universität Berlin → Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät → Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I

Humboldt University Berlin → Faculty of Economics → Institute for Economic Theory I

These are publications listed in RePEc written by alumni of the above institution who are registered with the RePEc Author Service and listed in the RePEc Genealogy. List of alumni. For a list of publications by current members of the department, see here. Register yourself.

This page is updated in the first days of each month.

| Working papers | Journal articles |

Working papers

2026

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2026, "When is a contest "additive"? A characterization of strategic equivalence," Working Papers in Economics and Statistics, Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics, number 3/2026, Jul.

2025

  1. Olivier Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2025, "Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11723.

2024

  1. Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2024, "Player Strength and Effort in Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 285, Mar.
  2. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Guertler, Oliver, 2024, "Overconfidence and gender gaps in career outcomes: insights from a promotion signaling model," Working Paper Series, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy, number 2024:21, Nov, DOI: https://www.ifau.se/globalassets/pd.

2023

  1. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2023, "Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 220, Mar.
  2. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2023, "The irrelevance of fee structures for certification," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 0017, May, DOI: 10.48462/opus4-4972.
  3. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2023, "On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 391, Mar.

2022

  1. Spencer Bastani & Lisa Dickmanns & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2022, "Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization Between Equally Competitive Spouses," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 155, Mar.

2021

  1. Thomas Giebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy, 2021, "Cross-Game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9396.

2020

  1. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020, "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 005, Jun.
  2. Colin von Negenborn & Martin Pollrich, 2020, "Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_019v2, Feb.
  3. Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020, "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_158, Feb.

2019

  1. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Chizheng Miao, 2019, "Ethnicity and tax filing behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7576.
  2. Giebe, Thomas & Lee, Miyu, 2019, "Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 62428, Feb.
  3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019, "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-030.
  4. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019, "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-040.

2018

  1. Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2018, "Competition and Fatigue At Work," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 134, Dec.

2017

  1. Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2017, "Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 60, Dec.

2015

  1. Martin Pollrich & Robert Schmidt, 2015, "Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation," BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 1, Sep.

2014

  1. Pollrich, Martin & Schmidt, Robert C., 2014, "Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 480, Sep.

2013

  1. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013, "Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 4228.
  2. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013, "Probabilistic Procurement Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 4320.
  3. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013, "All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 4330.
  4. Schmidt, Robert & Pollrich, Martin & Stiel, Caroline, 2013, "An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 79741.

2010

  1. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe, 2010, "How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1517, Dec.
  2. Giebe, Thomas, 2010, "Innovation Contests with Entry Auction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 307, Feb.
  3. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2010, "A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 310, Mar.

2009

  1. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe, 2009, "Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig's Greedy Heuristic," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 880.

2008

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2008, "Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 237, Jun.

2007

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007, "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 199, Apr.

2005

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Grebe, Tim & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005, "How to Allocate R&D (and Other) Subsidies: An Experimentally Tested Policy Recommendation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 108, Oct.

Undated

  1. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, undated, "Informational opacity and honest certication," BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 2013001.
  2. Martin Pollrich, undated, "Mediated Audits," BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 2015003.
  3. Martin Pollrich, undated, "The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -," BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics, number 2015004.

Journal articles

2026

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2026, "Player strength and effort in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106164.

2025

  1. Spencer Bastani & Lisa Dickmanns & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2025, "Household specialization and competition for promotion," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, volume 23, issue 1, pages 141-163, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11150-024-09706-9.
  2. Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin, 2025, "Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 95-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.012.

2024

  1. Thomas Giebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy, 2024, "Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 80-108, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8.
  2. Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2024, "The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 6, issue 1, pages 55-72, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220698.

2022

  1. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022, "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 264-280, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.006.
  2. Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2022, "Competition and fatigue," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, pages 236-249, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.032.
  3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022, "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 79-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.013.
  4. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022, "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 68, issue 7, pages 5146-5161, July, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4123.

2020

  1. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Miao, Chizheng, 2020, "Ethnicity and tax filing behavior," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2019.103215.
  2. Thomas Giebe & Miyu Lee, 2020, "Competitors in merger control: Shall they be merely heard or also listened to?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, volume 49, issue 3, pages 431-453, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-020-09649-3.
  3. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020, "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105074.

2018

  1. Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2018, "Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 31-34, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.004.

2017

  1. Martin Pollrich, 2017, "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 44-68, March.

2016

  1. Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo, 2016, "Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, pages 345-360, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.08.005.

2015

  1. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2015, "Probabilistic procurement auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 19, issue 1, pages 25-46, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-014-0161-6.

2014

  1. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014, "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 234, issue 3, pages 774-779, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.031.
  2. Giebe, Thomas, 2014, "Innovation contests with entry auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 165-176, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.02.004.
  3. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014, "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 36, issue C, pages 1-12, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.06.006.
  4. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014, "A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 43, issue 1, pages 179-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011.
  5. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2014, "All-pay-all aspects of political decision making," Public Choice, Springer, volume 161, issue 1, pages 73-90, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0127-1.
  6. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe & Jianpei Li, 2014, "Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 18, issue 2, pages 127-150, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0154-x.

2013

  1. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, 2013, "Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 80, issue 19, pages 15-18.

2012

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2012, "Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 81, issue 2, pages 403-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.11.003.

2008

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008, "License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 63, issue 1, pages 91-106, May.

2006

  1. Giebe, Thomas & Grebe, Tim & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2006, "How to allocate R&D (and other) subsidies: An experimentally tested policy recommendation," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 9, pages 1261-1272, November.

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