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The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification

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Listed:
  • Martin Pollrich
  • Roland Strausz

Abstract

In models of certification, possible restrictions on the nature of the fee structures are commonly analyzed. We show that they are irrelevant for the certifier's ability to maximize profits and trade efficiency. Our results establish that certification schemes involve two substitutable dimensions—the fee structure and the disclosure rule. In the context of a canonical unit good certification setup, these dimensions act as perfect substitutes for achieving trade efficiency and (monotone) distributions of rents; adjustments in the disclosure dimension can fully mitigate restrictions in the fee dimension, but these changes do affect market transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Pollrich & Roland Strausz, 2024. "The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 55-72, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:6:y:2024:i:1:p:55-72
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220698
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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