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Wie interagieren Banken und Ratingagenturen? Eine ökonomische Analyse des Bewertungsmarktes für strukturierte Finanzprodukte

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  • Braun, Tobias

Abstract

Seit Ausbruch der weltweiten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise 2007 findet in der Politik, den Medien und der Ökonomik eine breite Debatte zur Rolle und Regulierung der Ratingagenturen statt. Der vorliegende Artikel fokussiert explizit nur auf einen Aspekt dieser Debatte, nämlich die Rolle und Regulierung der Ratingagenturen im Rahmen ihrer Bewertung strukturierter Finanzprodukte. Anhand einer spieltheoretischen Modellierung wird gezeigt, dass sich die Interaktion von Ratingagenturen und Emittenten strukturierter Finanzprodukte im Zuge der Entwicklung und Bewertung strukturierter Finanzprodukte als ein klassisches Gefangenendilemma rekonstruieren lässt. In diesem geben die Ratingagenturen bewusst nicht-risikoadäquate Ratings ab, während die Emittenten bewusst unzureichende Prozessstandards bei der Produktentwicklung anwenden. Zur Überwindung dieses Dilemmas wird eine synchron erfolgende Regulierung der Ratingagenturen und der Emittenten vorgeschlagen, wodurch eine Besserstellung sowohl der Ratingagenturen als auch der Emittenten unter gleichzeitiger Erreichung des gesellschaftlich erwünschten Zustandes möglich wird. Davon ausgehend identifiziert die Arbeit drei Stellhebel für eine zielführende Regulierung der Ratingagenturen im Rahmen ihrer Bewertung strukturierter Finanzprodukte: (a) Verringerung bzw. Vermeidung des so genannten ratings shopping; (b) Reduzierung der Anzahl der Ratingagenturen – ggf. gar die Etablierung einer Monopollösung; (c) Erhöhung der Transparenz bezüglich der Risikoangemessenheit von Ratings strukturierter Finanzprodukte.

Suggested Citation

  • Braun, Tobias, 2011. "Wie interagieren Banken und Ratingagenturen? Eine ökonomische Analyse des Bewertungsmarktes für strukturierte Finanzprodukte," Discussion Papers 2011-17, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:201117
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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