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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

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  • Ensthaler, Ludwig
  • Giebe, Thomas

Abstract

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

Suggested Citation

  • Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2010. "A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 310, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:310
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    4. CZARNITZKI Dirk & LOPES BENTO Cindy, 2010. "Evaluation of public R&D policies: A cross-country comparison," LISER Working Paper Series 2010-31, LISER.
    5. Eickelpasch, Alexander & Fritsch, Michael, 2005. "Contests for cooperation--A new approach in German innovation policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1269-1282, October.
    6. Tuomas Takalo & Tanja Tanayama, 2010. "Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies?," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 16-41, February.
    7. David, Paul A. & Hall, Bronwyn H. & Toole, Andrew A., 2000. "Is public R&D a complement or substitute for private R&D? A review of the econometric evidence," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 497-529, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Innovation contests with entry auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 165-176.
    2. Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 35-63.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Mechanism Design; Knapsack Problem; Dominant Strategy; Budget; Procurement;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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