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The Effects Of Replacing China’S Two-Exam College Entrance System With A One-Exam System

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  • FENG LI

    (School of Securities and Futures, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan, P. R. China)

  • LI GAN

    (Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228, US3National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA)

Abstract

Since its inception in 1978, the China National College Entrance Exam has consisted of two different exams: the humanities exam and the science exam. In September 2014, the State Council decided to abolish the two-exam system in 2017 to adopt a single-exam system. This paper studies if and how abolishing the two-exam system would affect both humanities and science students in terms of their probabilities of being qualified for the first-tier university pool and ultimately being admitted to their respective first choice, first-tier universities. Based on micro-level student data from an anonymous province from 2004 to 2007, we find that adopting a one-exam system is likely to significantly help the humanities students in their probability of being admitted to their first choice institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng Li & Li Gan, 2017. "The Effects Of Replacing China’S Two-Exam College Entrance System With A One-Exam System," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 62(04), pages 783-796, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:62:y:2017:i:04:n:s0217590817400264
    DOI: 10.1142/S0217590817400264
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