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Exploration For Nonrenewable Resources In A Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result

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  • LUCA LAMBERTINI

    (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

The model proposed in this paper investigates a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may exploit either its own private pool or a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. There emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on whether each firm has access to its own pool or all firms exploit a common one, the aggregate exploration effort is either increasing or constant in the number of firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Lambertini, 2014. "Exploration For Nonrenewable Resources In A Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(02), pages 1-11.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:16:y:2014:i:02:n:s0219198914400118
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914400118
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    Cited by:

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    2. Vicknair, David & Tansey, Michael & O'Brien, Thomas E., 2022. "Measuring fossil fuel reserves: A simulation and review of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission approach," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential games; natural resources; oligopoly; C73; L13; Q30;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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