On Voting: A Public Choice Approach By Gordon Tullock. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998. Pp. ix, 208. $70.00
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DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00240.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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