IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v44y2023i5p2907-2923.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolutionary game analysis on incremental component suppliers and auto manufacturers' intelligent connected vehicle production decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Kai Li
  • Lulu Xia
  • Nenggui Zhao
  • Hong Fu

Abstract

This paper considers a two‐population evolutionary game between incremental component suppliers and new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers to explore their intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) production decisions in the long term. The government subsidy policy is taken into consideration in the extended model. Through analysis, we derive all the possible evolutionary results and obtain while the static subsidy affects the thresholds compared with non‐government subsidy situation, it has no effect on the overall evolutionary direction. However, the dynamic subsidy can remove the periodic behavior of the ICV supply chain participants. This paper provides some suggestions to enhance the ICV industry development.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai Li & Lulu Xia & Nenggui Zhao & Hong Fu, 2023. "Evolutionary game analysis on incremental component suppliers and auto manufacturers' intelligent connected vehicle production decisions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(5), pages 2907-2923, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:5:p:2907-2923
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3854
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3854
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/mde.3854?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Liu, Yajie & Dong, Feng, 2022. "What are the roles of consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government in the process of banning gasoline vehicles? Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 238(PC).
    2. Balasubramanian, Ganesh & Ponnachiyur Maruthasalam, Arulanantha Prabu, 2021. "Substitution effect of retailer store brand and manufacturer encroachment," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    3. Chuan Sun & Sifa Zheng & Yulin Ma & Duanfeng Chu & Junru Yang & Yuncheng Zhou & Yicheng Li & Tingxuan Xu, 2021. "An active safety control method of collision avoidance for intelligent connected vehicle based on driving risk perception," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 1249-1269, June.
    4. Liu, Weihua & Long, Shangsong & Xie, Dong & Liang, Yanjie & Wang, Jinkun, 2021. "How to govern the big data discriminatory pricing behavior in the platform service supply chain?An examination with a three-party evolutionary game model," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    5. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    6. Huang, Xingjun & Lin, Yun & Lim, Ming K. & Zhou, Fuli & Liu, Feng, 2022. "Electric vehicle charging station diffusion: An agent-based evolutionary game model in complex networks," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 257(C).
    7. Zhao, Chuan & Ma, Xuying & Wang, Kun, 2022. "The electric vehicle promotion in the cold-chain logistics under two-sided support policy: An evolutionary game perspective," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 14-34.
    8. Jiaru Bai & Shu Hu & Luyi Gui & Kut C. So & Zu‐Jun Ma, 2021. "Optimal Subsidy Schemes and Budget Allocations for Government‐Subsidized Trade‐in Programs," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(8), pages 2689-2706, August.
    9. Encarnação, Sara & Santos, Fernando P. & Santos, Francisco C. & Blass, Vered & Pacheco, Jorge M. & Portugali, Juval, 2018. "Paths to the adoption of electric vehicles: An evolutionary game theoretical approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 24-33.
    10. Wang, Jian & Gong, Siyuan & Peeta, Srinivas & Lu, Lili, 2019. "A real-time deployable model predictive control-based cooperative platooning approach for connected and autonomous vehicles," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 271-301.
    11. Gupta, Varun & Ivanov, Dmitry & Choi, Tsan-Ming, 2021. "Competitive pricing of substitute products under supply disruption," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    12. Ji, Shou-feng & Zhao, Dan & Luo, Rong-juan, 2019. "Evolutionary game analysis on local governments and manufacturers' behavioral strategies: Impact of phasing out subsidies for new energy vehicles," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tan, Bing Qing & Kang, Kai & Zhong, Ray Y., 2023. "Electric vehicle charging infrastructure investment strategy analysis: State-owned versus private parking lots," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 54-71.
    2. Li, Junqiang & Ren, Hao & Wang, Mingyue, 2021. "How to escape the dilemma of charging infrastructure construction? A multi-sectorial stochastic evolutionary game model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    3. Huang, Xingjun & Lin, Yun & Lim, Ming K. & Zhou, Fuli & Ding, Rui & Zhang, Zusheng, 2022. "Evolutionary dynamics of promoting electric vehicle-charging infrastructure based on public–private partnership cooperation," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 239(PD).
    4. Zhang, Mingye & Yang, Min & Gao, Yangfan, 2024. "Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of electric bus charging facility sharing under the governmental reward and punishment mechanism," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 307(C).
    5. Zhao, Tian & Liu, Zhixin & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2022. "Developing hydrogen refueling stations: An evolutionary game approach and the case of China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    6. Yin, Ting & Chen, Siyuan & Wang, Ge & Tan, Yuxuan & Teng, Fei & Zhang, Qi, 2024. "Can subsidy policies achieve fuel cell logistics vehicle (FCLV) promotion targets? Evidence from the beijing-tianjin-hebei fuel cell vehicle demonstration city cluster in China," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 311(C).
    7. Wenhui Zhao & Yimeng Liu & Jiansheng Hou & Lifang Liu, 2023. "Impact of Carbon Trading Mechanism Considering Blockchain Technology on the Evolution of New Energy Vehicle Industry in the Post-Subsidy Era," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(17), pages 1-18, September.
    8. Dongpu Fu & Jiarui Sun & Cuiyou Yao & Fulei Shi, 2024. "The influence of policy incentives on the diffusion of battery-swapping taxis and stations: a coupled evolutionary game model in complex networks," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 26(10), pages 26945-26969, October.
    9. Zhao, Dan & Ji, Shou-feng & Wang, He-ping & Jiang, Li-wen, 2021. "How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    10. Xueli Ma & Tianyuan Ren & Sardar M. N. Islam, 2024. "Multi-Party Collaboration in Agricultural Green Technology Innovation and Adoption: An Evolutionary Game Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(23), pages 1-34, November.
    11. Jiayang Xu & Jian Cao & Yunfei Wang & Xiangrong Shi & Jiayun Zeng, 2020. "Evolutionary Game on Government Regulation and Green Supply Chain Decision-Making," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-25, February.
    12. Ma, Xuan & Yu, Deqing & Wang, Ke, 2024. "Unraveling the intricacies of panic buying: An evolutionary game-theoretic exploration of the evolution and intervention," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    13. Liu, Changyu & Gong, Wanrong & Dong, Guanglong & Ji, Qiang, 2024. "Regulation of environmental, social and governance disclosure greenwashing behaviors considering the risk preference of enterprises," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    14. Fan, Ruguo & Bao, Xuguang & Du, Kang & Wang, Yuanyuan & Wang, Yitong, 2022. "The effect of government policies and consumer green preferences on the R&D diffusion of new energy vehicles: A perspective of complex network games," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 254(PA).
    15. Zhou, Xiaoxiao & Jia, Mengyu & Wang, Lu & Sharma, Gagan Deep & Zhao, Xin & Ma, Xiaowei, 2022. "Modelling and simulation of a four-group evolutionary game model for green innovation stakeholders: Contextual evidence in lens of sustainable development," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 500-517.
    16. Liu, Yang & Cui, Mengying & Gao, Xubin, 2023. "Building up scrap steel bases for perfecting scrap steel industry chain in China: An evolutionary game perspective," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 278(C).
    17. Wanting Chen & Zhi-Hua Hu, 2020. "Analysis of Multi-Stakeholders’ Behavioral Strategies Considering Public Participation under Carbon Taxes and Subsidies: An Evolutionary Game Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-26, January.
    18. Su, Q. & Zhou, P. & Ding, H. & Xydis, G., 2024. "Transition towards a hybrid energy system: Combined effects of renewable portfolio standards and carbon emission trading," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    19. Ling Liu & Qiaoyu Peng, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Green Innovation and Green Financing in Platform Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(13), pages 1-13, June.
    20. Liu, Changyu & Song, Yadong & Wang, Wei & Shi, Xunpeng, 2023. "The governance of manufacturers’ greenwashing behaviors: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of electric vehicles," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 333(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:5:p:2907-2923. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.