The political economy of gambling regulation
This paper presents an interest group model of gambling regulation and applies it to major changes in the regulation of US gambling markets. Gambling markets are among the most restricted and politicized markets in the American economy, yet economists interested in the economics of regulation have paid them little attention. Applying the economic theory of regulation to gambling markets can lead to greater understanding of current public policy. In addition, this application may shed light on the discipline itself, as to its ability to explain recurrent fluctuations in the extent of regulatory intervention over long periods of time. Broadly speaking, the interest group model is consistent with changes in the extent of regulation, including the recent period of liberalization and consequent growth in gambling. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 22 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin, Robert & Yandle, Bruce, 1990. "State Lotteries as Duopoly Transfer Mechanisms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 253-264, March.
- O'Sullivan,Arthur & Sexton,Terri A. & Sheffrin,Steven M., 2007.
"Property Taxes and Tax Revolts,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521035996, November.
- O'Sullivan,Arthur & Sexton,Terri A. & Sheffrin,Steven M., 1995. "Property Taxes and Tax Revolts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521461597, December.
- Easterlin, Richard A., 1976. "Population Change and Farm Settlement in the Northern United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(01), pages 45-75, March.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:5-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.