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Regulatory enforcement and compliance: Examining Danish agro-environmental policy

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  • PeterJ May

    (University of Washington)

  • Søren Winter

    (University of Aarhus)

Abstract

This study of municipal enforcement of agro-environmental regulations in Denmark provides an empirical understanding of how enforcement affects compliance. A key contribution is sorting out the relative influence of inspectors' different styles of enforcement and choices made by enforcement agencies. The latter are shown to be more important in bringing about compliance than are inspectors' enforcement styles. Municipal agencies are shown to increase compliance through the use of third parties, more frequent inspection, and setting priorities for inspection of major items. The findings about enforcement styles of inspectors suggest it is necessary to get tough up to a point, but beyond that the threat of coercion can be counterproductive. These findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of overly legalistic enforcement styles, particularly for the Danish culture with its strong emphasis on cooperation and consultation in regulation. But the findings also advise us to be cautious about the use of cooperative styles of enforcement in that we find evidence for capture of the enforcement process by agricultural organizations. This leads to a more nuanced view of enforcement rather than the broad generalizations found in the literature concerning legalism and cooperation. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Suggested Citation

  • PeterJ May & Søren Winter, 1999. "Regulatory enforcement and compliance: Examining Danish agro-environmental policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(4), pages 625-651.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:18:y:1999:i:4:p:625-651
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199923)18:4<625::AID-PAM5>3.0.CO;2-U
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Raymond J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, 1993. "Improving compliance with state environmental regulations," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 753-772.
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    Cited by:

    1. Corneliussen, Filippa, 2004. "Justifying non-compliance. A case study of a Norwegian biotech firm," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 36054, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Welch, Eric W. & Shin, Eunjung & Long, Jennifer, 2013. "Potential effects of the Nagoya Protocol on the exchange of non-plant genetic resources for scientific research: Actors, paths, and consequences," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 136-147.
    3. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Gerald E Fryxell & Benjamin Van Rooij, 2009. "Changes in Enforcement Styles among Environmental Enforcement Officials in China," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 41(11), pages 2706-2723, November.
    4. Aleksandra Jordanoska, 2021. "Regulatory enforcement against organizational insiders: Interactions in the pursuit of individual accountability," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 298-316, April.
    5. Cheng, Kuo-Tai, 2016. "Test of the mediating effects of regulatory decision tools in the communications regulator," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 277-289.
    6. Wallin, Are & Zannakis, Mathias & Johansson, Lars-Olof & Molander, Sverker, 2013. "Influence of interventions and internal motivation on Swedish homeowners’ change of on-site sewage systems," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 27-40.
    7. Jeroen van der Heijden & Jitske de Jong, 2009. "Towards a Better Understanding of Building Regulation," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 36(6), pages 1038-1052, December.
    8. Primmer, Eeva & Karppinen, Heimo, 2010. "Professional judgment in non-industrial private forestry: Forester attitudes and social norms influencing biodiversity conservation," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 136-146, February.
    9. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    10. Benjamin Van Rooij & Gerald E. Fryxell & Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo & Wei Wang, 2013. "From support to pressure: The dynamics of social and governmental influences on environmental law enforcement in Guangzhou City, China," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(3), pages 321-347, September.
    11. Carmen Arguedas & Dietrich Earnhart & Sandra Rousseau, 2017. "Non-uniform implementation of uniform standards," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 159-183, April.
    12. Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, 2009. "Testing responsive regulation in regulatory enforcement," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(4), pages 376-399, December.
    13. Buckley, Cathal, 2012. "Implementation of the EU Nitrates Directive in the Republic of Ireland — A view from the farm," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 29-36.
    14. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Gerald Erick Fryxell, 2005. "Governmental and Societal Support for Environmental Enforcement in China: An Empirical Study in Guangzhou," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 558-588.
    15. Araz Taeihagh & M Ramesh & Michael Howlett, 2021. "Assessing the regulatory challenges of emerging disruptive technologies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1009-1019, October.
    16. Shui-Yan Tang & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Gerald E Fryxell, 2003. "Enforcement Styles, Organizational Commitment, and Enforcement Effectiveness: An Empirical Study of Local Environmental Protection Officials in Urban China," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 35(1), pages 75-94, January.
    17. O'Donoghue, Cathal & Ryan, Mary & Kilcline, Kevin & Daly, Karen & Fenton, Owen & Heanue, Kevin & Kingston, Suzanne & Sherry, Jenny Mac & Murphy, Pat & O’Hora, Denis, 2018. "The Agri-Environmental Knowledge Innovation System for Water Quality Improvement," 166th Seminar, August 30-31, 2018, Galway, West of Ireland 276232, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    18. Boakye, Joseph, 2020. "Enforcement of logging regulations in Ghana: Perspectives of frontline regulatory officers," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    19. Søren C. Winter & Peter J. May, 2001. "Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(4), pages 675-698.
    20. David P. Carter, 2017. "Role perceptions and attitudes toward discretion at a decentralized regulatory frontline: The case of organic inspectors," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 353-367, December.
    21. Jeroen van der Heijden, 2021. "Why meta‐research matters to regulation and governance scholarship: An illustrative evidence synthesis of responsive regulation research," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 123-142, November.

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