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Evaluating public expenditure management systems: An experimental methodology with an application to the Australia and New Zealand reforms

Author

Listed:
  • Jose Edgardo Campos

    (The World Bank, Room N9079, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433)

  • Sanjay Pradhan

    (The World Bank, Room N9079, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433)

Abstract

This article examines how institutional arrangements affect the size, allocation, and use of public expenditures. It identifies a set of arrangements that can address underlying problems and affect three levels of expenditure outcomes - aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic prioritization, and technical efficiency in the use of resources. A diagnostic questionnaire is constructed which produces index values for each arrangement. This methodology is used to analyze the radical reforms introduced by New Zealand and Australia. The results show that New Zealand sought to achieve aggregate fiscal discipline and enhance technical efficiency through formal mechanisms for transparency and accountability. The Australian reforms sought to improve strategic prioritization through transparency of the medium-term costs of competing policies, and the devolution of detailed program decisions to line ministries within hard budgets.

Suggested Citation

  • Jose Edgardo Campos & Sanjay Pradhan, 1997. "Evaluating public expenditure management systems: An experimental methodology with an application to the Australia and New Zealand reforms," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(3), pages 423-445.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:16:y:1997:i:3:p:423-445
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199722)16:3<423::AID-PAM4>3.0.CO;2-J
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marije Schouwstra & Michael Ellman, 2006. "A New Explanatory Model for Policy Analysis and Evaluation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-063/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Swift, Zhicheng Li, 2006. "Managing the effects of tax expenditures on the national budget," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3927, The World Bank.

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