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Explaining corruption: are open countries less corrupt?

  • Roberta Gatti

    (The World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington DC, USA)

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    This paper analyses whether the presence of barriers to international trade and capital flows is associated with higher corruption. The evidence suggests that the main impact of trade barriers on corruption comes through the incentive to collusive behaviors between individuals and customs officials, rather than from the decreased foreign competition pressure on the domestic sector induced by restrictive trade policy. Interestingly, no clear association emerges between corruption and variables proxying for presence and intensity of controls on capital flows. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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    Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of International Development.

    Volume (Year): 16 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 6 ()
    Pages: 851-861

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    Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:16:y:2004:i:6:p:851-861
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    1. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:4:p:1289-1332 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 63, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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    6. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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    9. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 1993. "International comparisons of educational attainment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 363-394, December.
    10. Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, 2001. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 261-338 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July.
    12. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    13. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
    14. Gatti, Roberta, 1999. "Corruption and trade tariffs, or a case for uniform tariffs," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2216, The World Bank.
    15. International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
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