An analysis of a rural hospital's investment decision under different payment systems

From an economic perspective, large investments in medical equipment are justifiable only when many patients benefit. Although rural hospitals play a crucial role locally, the treatments they can offer are limited. In this study, I characterize investment level that maximizes the total surplus, encompassing patients' welfare and producer surplus, and subtracting treatment costs. Specifically, I account for economic externalities generated by the investment in the rural hospital and for different utility losses that patients suffer when they cannot be treated locally. I demonstrate that the optimal investment level can be implemented if the Health Authority has the power to set specific prices for each disease. Additionally, I explore a decentralized situation wherein the investment decision lies with the rural hospital manager, and the Health Authority can only make a discrete decision between two payment systems: Fee‐for‐service, which covers all treatment costs, or Diagnosis‐Related‐Groups, which reimburses a price per patient based on the overall average cost. I find that the Diagnosis‐Related‐Groups system outperforms the Fee‐for‐service in terms of total surplus when the treatment cost at the rural hospital is lower. However, when the rural hospital has higher costs and the Health Authority seeks to incentivize investment, the Fee‐for‐service system is superior.