Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina
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DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12475
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Cited by:
- Sebastián Einstoss, 2024. "“Todo está guardado en la memoria”: The Aftermath of State Violence in Argentina," Young Researchers Working Papers 14, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2024.
- Einstoss Sebastian, 2023. "Todo está guardado en la memoria: el efecto de la violencia de estado en Argentina (Versión preliminar)," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4648, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
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