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Misgovernance and Human Rights: The Case of Illegal Detention without Intent

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  • Tara Slough
  • Christopher Fariss

Abstract

Existing explanations of human rights abuses emphasize a strategic logic of repression. Yet certain classes of abuses may arise absent the intent to repress because of the misaligned bureaucratic incentives of state agents. To separate accounts of strategic repression from bureaucratic incentives, we study the responses of state agents working within the Haitian criminal justice system to a randomized, free legal assistance intervention for detainees held in illegal pretrial detention. Legal assistance addresses moral hazard problems of the bureaucrats responsible for processing cases. We demonstrate that legal assistance accelerates case advancement and liberation, in line with the view that large‐scale human rights abuses in the justice system can result from poor governance and not repressive intent.

Suggested Citation

  • Tara Slough & Christopher Fariss, 2021. "Misgovernance and Human Rights: The Case of Illegal Detention without Intent," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 148-165, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:65:y:2021:i:1:p:148-165
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12529
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Corwin, Hillary, 2023. "Coercive and catalytic strategies for human rights promotion: State violence and foreign assistance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    2. Margaret Ariotti & Simone Dietrich & Joseph Wright, 2022. "Foreign aid and judicial autonomy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 691-715, October.
    3. Valentina Stetsenko & Tetiana Havronska & Olena Makarova & Valentyna Konchakovska & Derkachova Nataliia, 2023. "Balance of Private and Public Interest Law in Matters of Restricting Human Rights for the Purposes of National Security," Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Richtmann Publishing Ltd, vol. 12, July.

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