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Public Benefits, Private Benefits, and Policy Mechanism Choice for Land-Use Change for Environmental Benefits


  • David J. Pannell


The choice of policy mechanisms for encouraging environmentally beneficial land-use change should depend on the relative levels of private (or internal) net benefits, and public (or external) net benefits. A map of recommended policy mechanisms is developed, depending on the relative levels of these variables. Positive incentives, negative incentives, and extension need to be targeted carefully to appropriate projects—where private net benefits are closer to zero, and/or public net benefits are more extremely positive or negative. Technology development is suggested where private net costs outweigh public net benefits. No action is recommended for many potential projects.

Suggested Citation

  • David J. Pannell, 2008. "Public Benefits, Private Benefits, and Policy Mechanism Choice for Land-Use Change for Environmental Benefits," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(2), pages 225-240.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:84:y:2008:i:2:p:225-240

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land


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