Instrument Choice when Regulators are Concerned about Resource Extinction
In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2011|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.ifro.ku.dk/english/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Neher,Philip A., 1990. "Natural Resource Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311748, February.
- Trond Bjørndal & Daniel Gordon & Veijo Kaitala & Marko Lindroos, 2004. "International Management Strategies for a Straddling Fish Stock: A Bio-Economic Simulation Model of the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(4), pages 435-457, December.
- Colin W. Clark & Gordon R. Munro & U. Rashid Sumaila, 2010. "Limits to the Privatization of Fishery Resources," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(2), pages 209-218.
- Reed, William J., 1979. "Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic harvesting models," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 350-363, December.
- Fischer, Carolyn & Laxminarayan, Ramanan, 2010. "Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 129-141, March.
- Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
- Erwin Bulte & G. van Kooten, 1999. "Marginal Valuation of Charismatic Species: Implications for Conservation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(1), pages 119-130, July.
- Rögnvaldur Hannesson & John Kenned, 2005. "Landing Fees versus Fish Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).
- Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2003. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 415-425.
- Crowards, Tom M., 1998. "Safe Minimum Standards: costs and opportunities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 303-314, June.
- Lars Gårn Hansen, 2008. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models: Comment," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(4), pages 708-711.
- Danielsson, Asgeir, 2002. "Efficiency of Catch and Effort Quotas in the Presence of Risk," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-33, January.
- Lars G. Hansen & Frank Jensen & Clifford Russell, 2008. "The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1130-1142.
- Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:foi:wpaper:2011_6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Geir Tveit)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.